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Introduction
Fighting words doctrine is controversial1 both with respect to its
breadth2 and even to whether it is still a live doctrine.3 While the United
States Supreme Court has occasionally cited the doctrine with approval
in dictum,4 the Court has not relied on it in any case since Chaplinsky

1.

Robert M. O’Neil, Hate Speech, Fighting Words, and Beyond—Why American
Law Is Unique, 76 Alb. L. Rev. 467, 472 (2013) (“Seventy years later,
Chaplinsky remains a persistent source of constitutional confusion.”); Burton
Caine, The Trouble with “Fighting Words”: Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire Is
a Threat to First Amendment Values and Should Be Overruled, 88 Marq. L.
Rev. 441, 443–44 (2004) (describing the Court’s fighting words exception as
“a category so ill-conceived that not once in the ensuing sixty-two years has
the United States Supreme Court upheld a conviction based on it”).

2.

G. Edward White, Falsity and the First Amendment, 72 SMU L. Rev. 513,
521 (2019) (discussing “a tendency to narrow the scope of certain unprotected
speech categories, such as . . . ‘fighting’ words”); Kevin P. Donoughe, Can
Dead Soldiers Revive a “Dead” Doctrine? An Argument for the Revitalization
of “Fighting Words” to Protect Grieving Families Post-Snyder v. Phelps, 63
Clev. St. L. Rev. 743, 750 (2015) (“The Court began to steadily narrow
the grounds on which ‘fighting words’ are held to apply . . . .”); Norman T.
Deutsch, Professor Nimmer Meets Professor Schauer (and Others): An
Analysis of “Definitional Balancing” as a Methodology for Determining the
“Visible Boundaries of the First Amendment,” 39 Akron L. Rev. 483, 502
(2006) (alteration in original) (“[S]ince Chaplinsky, the Court has actually
expanded the scope of protection afforded to such speech, by ‘narrow[ing]’ the
definitional line between fighting words that are excluded from the First
Amendment and speech that remains included.”).

3.

See Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest
Proposal?, 1990 Duke L.J. 484, 510 (1990) (suggesting that “Chaplinsky’s
fighting words doctrine is no longer good law”); Note, The Demise of the
Chaplinsky Fighting Words Doctrine: An Argument for Its Interment, 106
Harv. L. Rev. 1129 (1993) (“The jurisprudential history of the Chaplinsky
doctrine has led some commentators to conclude that the Court has sub rosa
overruled the entire fighting words doctrine . . . .”); Melody L. Hurdle, R.A.V.
v. City of St. Paul: The Continuing Confusion of the Fighting Words Doctrine,
47 Vand. L. Rev. 1143, 1156 (1994) (“[C]ourts and scholars repeatedly have
disagreed about the application and viability of the concept [of fighting
words].”); cf. Clay Calvert, Fighting Words in the Era of Texts, IMs and EMails: Can a Disparaged Doctrine Be Resuscitated to Punish Cyber-Bullies?,
21 DePaul J. Art, Tech. & Intell. Prop. L. 1, 1–2 (2010) (footnote omit–
ted) (discussing “the much-maligned class of speech known as fighting words”).

4.

See O’Neil, supra note 1, at 472 (“[T]he case has been persistently cited with
sufficient deference to imply that uttering ‘fighting words’ remains a recognized
exception to First Amendment freedoms.”); Linda Friedlieb, The Epitome of
an Insult: A Constitutional Approach to Designated Fighting Words, 72 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 385, 402 (2005) (“[T]he Court has repeatedly affirmed the
doctrine’s continued vitality.”)
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v. New Hampshire in which the doctrine was announced.5 That said, the
Court has never overruled Chaplinsky,6 and state courts continue to rely
on the doctrine to uphold convictions.7
Part II of this article discusses the ever-changing fighting words
jurisprudence. Regrettably, the Court has offered conflicting accounts
of what the doctrine involves and which speech limitations are constit–
utionally permissible.8 Part III discusses how some of the states have
applied the fighting words doctrine. As might be expected, the United
States Supreme Court’s mixed messaging has resulted in different state
approaches to which expressions constitute fighting words and are thus
subject to regulation.9 The article concludes that the Court’s confused
and confusing analysis has not only resulted in certain expressions being
(federally) constitutionally protected in some states but not in others,
but has also constrained the ability of states to effectuate public policy.
The Court’s commitment to free expression and to applying the law
with integrity is undermined by its failure to clearly articulate a
consistent approach to fighting words, and articulating such an app–
roach will help prevent harms that will otherwise continue unabated
and will help counteract the perception that the Court’s commitment
to free expression wavers depending upon the issues or individuals
before it.
5.

See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942); see also
Friedlieb, supra note 4, at 389 (noting that “the Supreme Court has never
affirmed another fighting words conviction”).

6.

Thomas M. Place, Offensive Speech and the Pennsylvania Disorderly Conduct
Statute, 12 Temp. Pol. & C.R.L. Rev. 47, 59 (2002); Katherine Grace
Howard, You Have the Right to Free Speech: Retaliatory Arrests and the
Pretext of Probable Cause, 51 Ga. L. Rev. 607, 630 (2017) (quoting
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572) (“[T]he category of fighting words, defined in
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire as ‘those which by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace,’ has not been
overruled . . . .”); Beth C. Boswell-Odum, The Fighting Words Doctrine and
Racial Speech on Campus, 33 S. Tex. L. Rev. 261, 283 (1992) (“Chaplinsky
has not been overruled . . . .”).

7.

See Evans v. State, 525 S.E.2d 780, 782 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999); State v. Read,
680 A.2d 944, 953 (Vt. 1996); State v. Szymkiewicz, 678 A.2d 473, 478–79
(Conn. 1996); State v. Nelson, No. 13-CR-13-107, 2014 WL 7237043, at *4
(Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2014); Watkins v. State, 377 S.W.3d 286, 291
(Ark. Ct. App. 2010).

8.

Compare Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (reversing the plaintiff’s
conviction because of the overly broad nature of the statute providing the
basis of his conviction), with Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 318 n.1, 321
(1951) (upholding the plaintiff’s conviction despite the broad language of the
statute providing the basis of his conviction.).

9.

See Evans, 525 S.E.2d at 782; Read, 680 A.2d at 953; Szymkiewicz, 678
A.2d at 478–79; Nelson, 2014 WL 7237043 at *4; Watkins, 377 S.W.3d at
291.
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I.

The Ever-Changing Fighting Words Doctrine

In the very case in which the fighting words doctrine was
recognized, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,10 the Court offered mixed
signals about when the doctrine could be invoked to uphold convictions.
In subsequent cases, the Court has continued to offer contradictory
indications about what kinds of fighting words limitations pass
constitutional muster, ultimately leaving the impression that members
of the Court either cannot agree about or do not understand what the
fighting words doctrine is or when it can be applied.
A. The Doctrine Announced

In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Court upheld a conviction for
disturbing the peace.11 Chaplinsky had been distributing literature
denouncing religion as a racket.12 Citizens complained to the City
Marshal, Bowering,13 who replied that Chaplinsky was merely exercising
his rights14 but who also warned Chaplinsky that the crowd was growing
restless.15 Some hours later, the crowd “got out of hand and treated
Chaplinsky with some violence.”16 A traffic officer escorted Chaplinsky
to the station, likely to protect him.17 The United States Supreme Court
expressly noted that the traffic officer “did not inform [Chaplinsky] that

10.

315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942).

11.

See id. at 574 (“[T]he challenged statute, on its face and as applied, does
not contravene the Fourteenth Amendment.”).

12.

See id. at 570.

13.

Id.

14.

Id. (“Bowering told them that Chaplinsky was lawfully engaged . . . .”).

15.

Id.

16.

State v. Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d 754, 758 (N.H. 1941).

17.

See id. at 758 (noting that the officer’s action was “apparently more for
[Chaplinsky’s] protection than for arrest, since his arrest was definitely fixed
only after he uttered the words charged”); Hurdle, supra note 3, at 1147 (“A
police officer led Chaplinsky toward the city police station to protect him
from nearby listeners who reacted violently to the derogatory comments.”);
Michael J. Mannheimer, The Fighting Words Doctrine, 93 Colum. L. Rev.
1527, 1534 (1993) (“[A] police officer escorted Chaplinsky toward the police
station, apparently for his own protection.”).
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he was under arrest or that he was going to be arrested,”18 at least
implying that there was no basis for an arrest at that point.19
Along the way, Chaplinsky and the officer ran into Bowering to
whom Chaplinsky allegedly said, “You are a God damned racketeer”
and “a damned Fascist and the whole government of Rochester are
Fascists or agents of Fascists.”20 Chaplinsky claimed that his comments
were made after Bowering had called Chaplinsky a damned bastard.21
Chaplinsky was charged with and convicted of making comments that
would likely bring about an immediate breach of the peace.22
When reviewing his conviction, the New Hampshire Supreme Court
understood that Chaplinsky was probably angry because he had been
assaulted by the crowd and because he believed that the police had
failed to protect him.23 But, the New Hampshire court reasoned, even
if it were true that Chaplinsky had been provoked, that would not
excuse his having called Bowering names.24
The purpose of the statute at issue was “to preserve the public
peace, no words being ‘forbidden except such as have a direct tendency
to cause acts of violence by the person to whom, individually, the
remark is addressed.’”25 When explaining the standard to determine
whether particular expressions would count as fighting words, the New
Hampshire Court explained that the “test is what men of common
18.

Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 570. See also Daniel A. Farber, The Categorical
Approach to Protecting Speech in American Constitutional Law, 84 Ind. L.J.
917, 920 (2009) (“When a disturbance occurred, the traffic officer on duty at
the intersection hustled the speaker off to the police station, but without ever
telling him formally that he was under arrest.”).

19.

But see David Goldberger, Sources of Judicial Reluctance to Use Psychic
Harm as a Basis for Suppressing Racist, Sexist and Ethnically Offensive
Speech, 56 Brook. L. Rev. 1165, 1174 (1991) (“The defendant . . . had just
been arrested for publicly making derogatory religious statements.”).

20.

Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569.

21.

Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d at 759 (“The defendant admittedly called the Marshal
a damned racketeer and Fascist, in exchange, as the defendant says, for the
Marshal’s calling him a damned bastard.”).

22.

See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569; see also Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d at 758 (“Its
plain tendency was to further breach of order, and it was itself a breach of
the peace.”).

23.

See Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d at 758; see also Caine, supra note 1, at 448 (suggesting
that Chaplinsky was “[p]rovoked and angered by Marshal Bowering’s words,
by the refusal of the police to protect his constitutional right to speak, as well
as by the blows he had received from the crowd”).

24.

Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d at 759 (“Chaplinsky could no more defend unlawful speech
on the ground of provocation than could one of the street-crowd have defended
a charge of calling Chaplinsky names on the ground that the name-caller had
been incensed by Chaplinsky’s teachings.”).

25.

Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573 (quoting Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d at 758).
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intelligence would understand would be words likely to cause an average
addressee to fight.”26 There was no indication that the individual at
whom the epithets were directed (Bowering) was even tempted to
engage in fisticuffs,27 but that did not matter—the New Hampshire
Supreme Court reasoned that while there may be a time “when the
words ‘damned Fascist’ will cease to be generally regarded as ‘fighting
words’ when applied face-to-face to an average American, this is not
the time.”28 The United States Supreme Court cited the New Hampshire
court’s interpretation with approval.29 Because the statute at issue was
limited to punishing individuals who had uttered fighting words,30 the
Court held that the application of the statute to Chaplinsky’s com–
ments did not violate First Amendment guarantees.31
That Bowering was unlikely to engage in fisticuffs after being called
a fascist32 did not immunize Chaplinsky’s conviction under the statute,
given that the average person (at the time33) might well have responded
with violence when called such a name.34 This position helps cast light
on the proper interpretation of Cantwell v. Connecticut,35 decided two
years earlier, which involved someone expressing offensive opinions
about religious groups.36
In a neighborhood known to have a high concentration of
Catholics,37 Jesse Cantwell stopped two individuals and asked them if
26.

Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d at 762.

27.

Caine, supra note 1, at 454 (“Nor was there any evidence that City Marshal
Bowering was provoked to violence or that any mythical reasonable man
would have been so provoked.”).

28.

Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d at 762.

29.

See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573.

30.

See Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d at 758 (“[N]o words were forbidden except such as
have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to whom,
individually, the remark is addressed.”).

31.

Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 574 (“Nor can we say that the application of the
statute to the facts disclosed by the record substantially or unreasonably
impinges upon the privilege of free speech.”).

32.

See supra note 27 and accompanying text.

33.

Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d at 762.

34.

Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 574 (“Argument is unnecessary to demonstrate that
the appellations ‘damned racketeer’ and ‘damned Fascist’ are epithets likely
to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of
the peace.”).

35.

310 U.S. 296 (1940).

36.

Id. at 302–03.

37.

Id. at 301 (“Cassius Street is in a thickly populated neighborhood, where
about ninety per cent of the residents are Roman Catholics.”).
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he could play a phonograph record for them.38 When they consented,
he played a record highly critical of the Roman Catholic Church.39 The
two men, who were Catholic,40 were “incensed” and “were tempted to
strike Cantwell unless he went away.”41 Cantwell went away when told
to do so.42
The Court noted that there “was no evidence that [Cantwell] was
personally offensive or entered into any argument with those he
interviewed.”43 Further, there was no showing either that Cantwell’s
“deportment was noisy, truculent, overbearing or offensive” or that “he
intended to insult or affront the hearers by playing the record.”44 Yet,
the Court was not thereby implying that the record contents were
innocuous—on the contrary, the record “naturally would offend not
only persons of that persuasion [(Roman Catholics)], but all others who
respect the honestly held religious faith of their fellows.”45
If indeed the comments were that offensive, their utterance might
well have resulted in violence. Further, the Court was quite clear that
“[w]hen clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interference with
traffic upon the public streets, or other immediate threat to public safe–
ty, peace, or order, appears, the power of the state to prevent or punish
is obvious.”46 Nonetheless, the Court reversed Cantwell’s conviction.47
Commentators offer different theories as to why that conviction did
not pass constitutional muster.48 One interpretation of Cantwell is that
the relevant standard regarding a clear and present danger of violence
had not been met because the violence had not been imminent but
would only have occurred if Cantwell had refused to leave.49 But if that
38.

See id. at 302–03.

39.

Id. at 303 (explaining that Cantwell “played the record ‘Enemies,’ which
attacked the religion and church of the two men, who were Catholics.”).

40.

Id. (noting that the “two men . . . were Catholics”).

41.

Id.

42.

Id. (“On being told to be on his way he left their presence.”).

43.

Id.

44.

Id. at 308–09.

45.

Id. at 309.

46.

Id. at 308.

47.

Id. at 311.

48.

See infra notes 51–68 and accompanying text.

49.

Andrew M. Zeitlin, Comment, A Test of Faith: Accommodating Religious
Employees’ “Work-Related Misconduct” in the United States and Canada,
15 Compar. Lab. L.J. 250, 254 (1994) (“Had there been evidence that the
Cantwells’ solicitation presented a clear and present danger of riot or dis–
order, the Court likely would have upheld Connecticut’s power to punish the
offense.”); Sheila M. Cahill, Note, The Public Forum: Minimum Access,
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is why Cantwell’s speech was protected, then the relevant constitutional
protection does not seem very robust. Suppose that the two passersby
had not told Cantwell to leave but instead had simply struck him.50 In
that event, the very speech on the record would seem to have been the
cause of imminent violence. If that speech would then have been
unprotected, then the constitutional protection afforded to Cantwell’s
speech would not only have depended upon its content but also on who
happened to hear it.51
Constitutional protections do not seem very strong if they depend
upon the luck of the draw, e.g., who happens to be in the audience
when particular comments are made.52 That said, Cantwell is not a
particularly good case to explore the connection between constitutional
protections and chance. Cantwell had gone into a neighborhood known
for having a high concentration of Catholics,53 so it was not merely a
matter of chance that the persons listening to the record were
Catholic.54 Arguably, playing a record making highly offensive
Equal Access, and the First Amendment, 28 Stan. L. Rev. 117, 120 n.20
(1975) (“[A]ctual violence apparently was never imminent.”).
50.

Cf. Brett G. Johnson, The Heckler’s Veto: Using First Amendment Theory
and Jurisprudence to Understand Current Audience Reactions Against
Controversial Speech, 21 Comm. L. & Pol’y 175, 182 (2016) (“Cantwell
leaves the door open for future convictions of speakers who incite a hostile
audience to a violent reaction.”).

51.

But see Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal
Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted
Zones, 90 Cornell L. Rev. 1277, 1292 (2005) (alteration in original)
(quoting Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 308–09) (suggesting that the Cantwell “Court
set aside the conviction because the speech constituted breach of the peace
only because of ‘the effect of [the speaker’s] communication upon his hear–
ers’”).

52.

Cf. Dana Berliner, Looking Back Ten Years After Kelo, 125 Yale L.J.F.
82, 90 (2015) (“Highly varied and uneven protections might be interesting
as a matter of social policy experimentation, but they are no way to deal
with the protection of constitutional rights.”) (footnote omitted); Dan T.
Coenen, Freedom of Speech and the Criminal Law, 97 B.U. L. Rev. 1533,
1555 (2017) (“The problem with this doctrinal approach is hard to miss: in
effect, it permits the state to punish a speaker because of the unlawfully
belligerent—indeed, the riotously belligerent—actions of unsympathetic
listeners.”).

53.

Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 301 (1939); see supra text
accompanying note 40.

54.

See Marie A. Failinger, Five Modern Notions in Search of an Author: The
Ideology of the Intimate Society in Constitutional Speech Law, 30 U. Tol.
L. Rev. 251, 274 (1999) (quoting Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 301–03) (“Jesse
Cantwell and his Jehovah’s Witness comrades were ‘invading’ some of the
most sensitive public space moderns can imagine, going from house to house
in a ‘thickly populated,’ heavily Catholic neighborhood in New Haven,
offering books or playing records which attacked Catholics scurrilously as
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comments about Catholicism would be even more likely to pose a clear
and present danger of engendering violence if those hearing the
comments were themselves (likely) Catholic55 than would making such
comments in front of an audience composed of individuals likely of a
different faith.56 In any event, it is somewhat difficult to believe that
Cantwell’s speech did not create a clear and present danger of violence57
but that Chaplinsky’s did, given that there was no suggestion that
Bowering was even tempted to strike Chaplinsky.58

‘enemies,’ thus highly offending several hearers.”); see also David S. Allen,
Spatial Frameworks and the Management of Dissent: From Parks to Free
Speech Zones, 16 Comm. L. & Pol’y 383, 404 (2011) (“Cantwell and his
sons focused on a neighborhood where about 90% of the residents were
Roman Catholics . . . .”).
55.

See William C. Nevin, “Fighting Slurs”: Contemporary Fighting Words and
the Question of Criminally Punishable Racial Epithets, 14 First Amend.
L. Rev. 127, 133 (2015) (discussing “Cantwell’s preaching . . . [and] its
natural tendency to offend Catholics”); Stewart Jay, The Creation of the
First Amendment Right to Free Expression: From the Eighteenth Century
to the Mid-Twentieth Century, 34 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 773, 883 (2008)
(“But hadn’t Cantwell created an ‘immediate threat’ to public order, saved
only by his swift retreat?”); R. George Wright, The Heckler’s Veto Today,
68 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 159, 162 (2017) (quoting Cantwell, 310 U.S. at
309) (“Cantwell’s two initially consensual listeners to his anti-religious and
anti-Catholic speech ‘were in fact highly offended.’ In this instance, offense
at least momentarily threatened to transition into physical violence against
the speaker.”).

56.

But see Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 309 (“[I]t then singles out the Roman Catholic
Church for strictures couched in terms which naturally would offend not
only persons of that persuasion, but all others who respect the honestly held
religious faith of their fellows.”).

57.

Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 Yale L.J. 978, 1011 (2011)
(“[T]he Court held that Cantwell could not be convicted unless a clear and
present danger existed of violence or other social harm and that the fact that
Cantwell’s speech offended others was not a constitutionally permissible
ground for punishment.”); Jay, supra note 55, at 889 (discussing the “tight
limits on what speech would be found to present a clear and present danger
of inciting violence or other criminal conduct”).

58.

Arnold H. Loewy, Distinguishing Speech from Conduct, 45 Mercer L. Rev.
621, 628 (1994) (“There is no reason to think that Marshal Bowering was
about to assault Chaplinsky.”); see also Jonathan A. Weiss, A Road Not
Taken, 26 Seton Hall Legis. J. 415, 449 (2002) (“[T]he police officer
should not be considered a danger to be provoked into violence by the man’s
speech.”). Some commentators do not seem to appreciate this point. See,
e.g., Calvin R. Massey, Hate Speech, Cultural Diversity, and the
Foundational Paradigms of Free Expression, 40 UCLA L. Rev. 103, 160
(1992) (“If Jesse Cantwell had, instead, insulted his auditors personally in a
fashion likely to produce immediate violence, as did Walter Chaplinsky, the
Constitution’s free expression guarantee (at least circa 1940) would pose no
problem to legal sanction.”).
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The Chaplinsky Court discussed a few kinds of speech that do not
trigger First Amendment protections, including “the insulting or
‘fighting’ words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”59 According to the
New Hampshire law that Chaplinsky allegedly violated, fighting words
were those that “have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the
person to whom, individually, the remark is addressed.”60 Yet if
Bowering was the individual to whom the words were addressed and
there was no indication that Bowering was even tempted to assault
Chaplinsky, then one would have thought that the fighting words
doctrine would not have been triggered.
A closer examination of the doctrine articulated by the New
Hampshire Supreme Court and endorsed by the United States Supreme
Court reveals that the doctrine at issue was not focused on the
addressee’s actual or probable reactions.61 Instead, the test as to wheth–
er words had the prohibited tendency involved “what men of common
intelligence would understand would be words likely to cause an average
addressee to fight.”62 Fighting words included “‘classical fighting
words’, words in current use less ‘classical’ but equally likely to cause
violence, and other disorderly words, including profanity, obscenity and
threats.”63
Interpreted in light of Chaplinsky, Cantwell was not emphasizing
the fact that Cantwell had not in fact incited someone to strike him.
Instead, the Court in Cantwell was emphasizing that the statute under
which Cantwell was prosecuted was not narrowly tailored to prohibit
only fighting words.64 The Cantwell Court explained:
Although the contents of the record not unnaturally aroused
animosity, we think that, in the absence of a statute narrowly
59.

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1941).

60.

Id. at 573 (citing State v. Brown, 38 A. 731, 732 (N.H. 1895)).

61.

See State v. Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d 754, 762 (“The test is what men of common
intelligence would understand would be words likely to cause an average
addressee to fight. We have never applied the statute otherwise. The English
language has a number of words and expressions which by general consent
are ‘fighting words’ when said without a disarming smile.”); Chaplinsky, 315
U.S. at 573.

62.

Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573. A separate issue is whether the standard of what
would cause the common addressee to fight takes into account gender-related
differences. See, e.g., Bunkosal Chhun, Note, Catcalls: Protected Speech or
Fighting Words?, 33 T. Jefferson L. Rev. 273, 274 (2011) (“[M]ost women
do not respond violently to verbal abuse, leaving verbal conduct, like catcalls,
excluded by the doctrine.”).

63.

Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573 (quoting Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d at 762).

64.

Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1939).
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drawn to define and punish specific conduct as constituting a clear
and present danger to a substantial interest of the State, the
petitioner’s communication, considered in the light of the consti–
tutional guarantees, raised no such clear and present menace to
public peace and order as to render him liable to conviction of the
common law offense in question.65

Thus, even though Cantwell’s speech was offensive and might
indeed have aroused animosity and caused violence, that was not
enough for him to be convicted of causing a breach of the peace, given
that the statute was not limited to proscribing those kinds of utterances
having a clear and present danger of provoking violence. While the state
is of course permitted to act to prevent riots and public disturbances,66
the means used to do so must be appropriately tailored so as not to
preclude protected speech.67
Chaplinsky itself provides additional support for the interpretation
that an important element of these cases involves the statutes under
which the individuals were prosecuted, rather than merely the partic–
ular contents of the respective communications.68 Chaplinsky had been
addressing the crowd and had been warned that the crowd was getting
restless,69 i.e., that his continuing to speak might in fact result in unrest.
Nonetheless, he continued to speak and was eventually attacked by the
crowd.70 He was later brought towards the station by a police officer,71
although the Court expressly noted that Chaplinsky was not told that
he was under arrest.72 Yet, Chaplinsky had addressed the crowd in a
way that he had already been warned might well result in violence, and
the Court nonetheless suggested that the crowd’s reaction was not what
provided the basis for the arrest.73 If that is so, then one’s having made
65.

Id. (emphasis added).

66.

Id. at 308.

67.

Id. at 311.

68.

See Nevin, supra note 55, at 133 (discussing the role played by the breadth
of the respective statutes in Cantwell and Chaplinsky); see also Frolik v. State,
392 So. 2d 846, 847 (Ala. 1981) (discussing Chaplinsky and Cantwell and then
noting that “the statute must be carefully drawn or be authoritatively
construed to punish only unprotected speech and not be susceptible of app–
lication to protected expression” (quoting Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518,
522 (1972))).

69.

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 570 (1942).

70.

State v. Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d 754, 758 (N.H. 1941).

71.

See id.

72.

Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 570.

73.

See William Shepard McAninch, A Catalyst for the Evolution of Consti–
tutional Law: Jehovah’s Witnesses in the Supreme Court, 55 U. Cin. L.
Rev. 997, 1033 (1987) (“It was not until he was being led to the police
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comments that would probably or even actually result in violence might
not suffice to establish that one had uttered fighting words.74
Suppose that Cantwell had been struck by those listening to the
record. Even so, Cantwell’s conviction would likely have been reversed,
given the content of his speech and the breadth of the statute under
which he was prosecuted.75 But if that is so, then the Cantwell Court’s
having noted that no violence had in fact taken place76 was not meant
to suggest implicitly that if there had been violence the breach of peace
conviction would have been upheld.77 On the contrary, the conviction
still would not have been upheld, because there still would have been
“no assault or threatening of bodily harm, no truculent bearing, no
intentional discourtesy, no personal abuse”78 by Cantwell. Further,
there still would have been a “situation analogous to a conviction under
a statute sweeping in a great variety of conduct under a general and
indefinite characterization, and leaving to the executive and judicial
branches too wide a discretion in its application.”79
If the Cantwell Court was not suggesting that the lack of violence
was what provided the basis for striking down Cantwell’s conviction,
then some explanation must be offered as to why the Court bothered
to mention that there had been no violence. The Court was likely
illustrating its point that “in practically all [of the breach of peace
station (whether for protection or arrest is unclear) that Chaplinsky spoke
the offending words to the city marshal.”).
74.

In other contexts, the Court has rejected that the prevention of violence will
justify any speech prohibition. See Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor
Dairies, 312 U.S. 287, 296 (1941) (“Nor may a state enjoin peaceful picketing
merely because it may provoke violence in others.” (citing Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697, 721–22 (1931) and Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940))).

75.

See Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200 (1966) (noting that “[c]onvictions
for ‘breach of the peace’ where the offense was imprecisely defined were . . .
reversed”).

76.

See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309 (1939).

77.

But see Massey, supra note 58, at 157 (“The Supreme Court reversed
Cantwell’s conviction of inciting a breach of the peace because, in part, there
was not a sufficient causal connection between his speech and the threatened
harm.”).

78.

Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 310; see also Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of LowValue Speech, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 2166, 2201 (2015) (explaining that the
Cantwell Court’s “analysis would have been different had the defendant
engaged with his unwilling interlocutors in a less polite fashion”).

79.

Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 308; see also Nevin, supra note 55, at 133 (footnote
omitted) (quoting Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 310) (“Cantwell’s preaching, despite
its natural tendency to offend Catholics and all those who adhere to organized
religion, failed to meet this standard of ‘profane, indecent, or abusive
remarks . . . .’”).
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cases], the provocative language which was held to amount to a breach
of the peace consisted of profane, indecent, or abusive remarks directed
to the person of the hearer.”80 According to this interpretation, the
Court was not providing the criterion for a disturbing-the-peace convic–
tion. Instead, the Court was merely noting that these cases rarely, if
ever, involve violence if no personal insults are made.
Terminiello v. Chicago81 involved a disorderly conduct conviction82
arising out of a speech in Chicago causing a violent reaction in a
crowd.83 When striking down the conviction, the Court focused on the
construction of the statute rather than on whether Terminiello’s words
would likely result in a breach of the peace.84 Indeed, one might infer
from the Court’s description of Terminiello’s speech that the breach of
the peace was readily foreseeable—“[p]etitioner in his speech con–
demned the conduct of the crowd outside and vigorously, if not
viciously, criticized various political and racial groups whose activities
he denounced as inimical to the nation’s welfare.”85 It would be
unsurprising for such language to result in unrest, although there was
some question whether his speech in fact caused the disturbance. 86
The statute under which Terminiello had been convicted was not
merely designed to prevent riots or disorder. Instead, “the statutory
80.

Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 309.

81.

337 U.S. 1 (1949).

82.

Id. at 2.

83.

See id. at 13 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“But the local court that tried
Terminiello was . . . dealing with a riot and with a speech that provoked a
hostile mob and incited a friendly one, and threatened violence between the
two.”); Eva DuBuisson, Teaching from the Closet: Freedom of Expression
and Out-Speech by Public School Teachers, 85 N.C. L. Rev. 301, 327 (2006)
(“Terminiello gave a speech to a large audience in a public meeting hall;
outside, an angry crowd of protesters condemned his speech and created a
violent disturbance.”); Comment, The Constitutionality of A Requirement to
Give Notice Before Marching, 118 U. Pa. L. Rev. 270, 274 (1969) (“In
Terminiello, the appellant delivered a speech severely attacking various
political and racial groups, thereby creating great unrest in the crowd
assembled outside the auditorium in which he was speaking.”).

84.

Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 5 (“[T]he gloss which Illinois placed on the
ordinance gives it a meaning and application which are conclusive on us.
We need not consider whether as construed it is defective in its entirety. As
construed and applied it at least contains parts that are unconstitutional.
The verdict was a general one; and we do not know on this record but what
it may rest on the invalid clauses.”); see also Lynch v. State, 236 A.2d 45,
53 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1967) (emphasizing the role of statutory construc–
tion in Terminiello).

85.

Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 3 (emphasis added).

86.

See id. at 8 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (suggesting that those outside the
hall where the address was given did not hear Terminiello’s words).
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words ‘breach of the peace’ were defined . . . to include speech which
‘stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition of
unrest, or creates a disturbance . . . .”87 But speech might invite dispute
without resulting in violence or endangering the public. The Court
reasoned that “a function of free speech under our system of government
is to invite dispute.”88 Because “[t]he ordinance . . . permitted convic–
tion of petitioner if his speech stirred people to anger, invited public
dispute, or brought about a condition of unrest,”89 the “conviction
[could] . . . not stand.”90 The Court expressly declined to address
whether the speech at issue constituted fighting words,91 instead basing
its reversal of the conviction on the breadth of the statute.92
One court concluded that Terminiello undercut the inclusion of the
“inflicts injury” prong93 of the characterization of fighting words as
“those which by their very utterance inflict injury or incite an
87.

Id. at 4 (majority opinion).

88.

Id.

89.

Id. at 5.

90.

Id.

91.

Id. at 3 (“The argument here has been focused on the issue of whether the
content of petitioner’s speech was composed of derisive, fighting words,
which carried it outside the scope of the constitutional guarantees. . . . We
do not reach that question, for there is a preliminary question that is
dispositive of the case.” (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1942) and Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1939))).

92.

But see id. at 7 (Vinson, C.J. dissenting) (“[T]he Illinois courts construed
the ordinance as punishing only the use of ‘fighting words.’ Their opinions
plainly show that they affirmed because they thought that the petitioner’s
speech had been found by the jury to come within that category.”).

93.

State v. Drahota, 788 N.W.2d 796, 802 (Neb. 2010) (“In fact, it was only 7
years after Chaplinsky that the Court began to retreat from the ‘inflict injury’
part of the definition. In Terminiello v. Chicago, the Court stated that a
conviction could not rest on the grounds that the speech merely ‘stirred
people to anger, invited public dispute, or brought about a condition of
unrest.’ To fall within the First Amendment exception for fighting words,
speech must be ‘shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a
serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance,
or unrest.’” (quoting Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 5)). For a different
interpretation, see City of Bismarck v. Schoppert, 469 N.W.2d 808, 811
(N.D. 1991), where the Supreme Court of North Dakota explained:
Whatever the Chaplinsky Court meant by the phrase “words which
by their very utterance inflict injury,” Terminiello and Gooding
stand for the proposition that the fact that words are vulgar or
offensive is not sufficient to remove them from the protection of the
first amendment and into the arena in which the state can make
conduct criminal.
City of Bismarck, 469 N.W.2d at 811.
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immediate breach of the peace.”94 But there are a number of ways to
interpret Terminiello that have nothing to do with the “inflicts injury”
prong. For example, Terminiello had been addressing remarks to one
audience about another group of people.95 Insofar as the “profane,
indecent, or abusive remarks [must be] directed to the person of the
hearer,”96 his address might have been thought not to count as fighting
words because of the audience at whom it was addressed—that audience
would neither have been incited to commit violence nor would have
been likely to have felt injured by Terminiello’s words. Arguably, the
Court did not see fit to discuss whether anyone in the audience would
have felt injured because the Court did not believe injury a likely result
in light of the audience’s composition, just as the Court likely did not
believe that members of that audience would react violently. If one of
the reasons that Terminiello’s speech did not constitute fighting words
was that it was directed at an audience who might be sympathetic to
his position,97 then the Terminiello Court would not have been excising
the “inflicts injury” component of fighting words, but instead would
have been focusing on the audience element of the fighting words
doctrine.
After Terminiello, one might have inferred that convictions for
disorderly conduct or breach of the peace would not be upheld if based
on overly broad statutes. Feiner v. New York,98 a case decided two years
after Terminiello, suggests that the Court is not always willing to
vacate convictions under overbroad statutes.
Irving Feiner was convicted of disorderly conduct.99 He had been
addressing a crowd, which had become restless.100 Some in the crowd
supported his position while others did not, and the police were
allegedly fearful that there might be a fight.101 Feiner was twice asked

94.

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (emphasis added).

95.

Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 3 (explaining that Terminiello was addressing an
audience inside an auditorium about people who were protesting outside of
the auditorium).

96.

Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309 (1939) (emphasis added).

97.

Those who were viciously attacked in the speech might not have heard his
words. See Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 8 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (noting that
“those outside the hall . . . did not hear the speech”).

98.

340 U.S. 315 (1951).

99.

Id. at 316.

100. Id. at 317.
101. Id. (“Because of the feeling that existed in the crowd both for and against
the speaker, the officers finally ‘stepped in to prevent it from resulting in a
fight.’”).

263

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 1·2020
Those Are Fighting Words, Aren’t They?

to stop talking, but he refused.102 He was then arrested for violating the
following statute:
Any person who with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or
whereby a breach of the peace may be occasioned, commits any
of the following acts shall be deemed to have committed the
offense of disorderly conduct:
1. Uses offensive, disorderly, threatening, abusive or insulting
language, conduct or behavior;
2. Acts in such a manner as to annoy, disturb, interfere with,
obstruct, or be offensive to others;
3. Congregates with others on a public street and refuses to move
on when ordered by the police.103

The Court upheld the conviction.104
Feiner is hard to square with the previous cases in part because of
the statute’s breadth and in part because of the Court’s reasoning.105
The statute prohibited speech that involved fighting words—abusive or
insulting language—but also prohibited the kind of protected speech
whose prohibition was in violation of constitutional guarantees. For
example, criminalizing annoying106 or offensive107 language includes too
much. A statute’s criminalizing protected speech might result in a jury’s
finding an individual guilty of having committed a crime when the
speech for which she was convicted was not the kind of speech that is

102. Id. at 318.
103. Id. at 318 n.1 (quoting N.Y. Penal Law § 722 (current version at N.Y.
Penal Law § 240.20 (McKinney 2020))).
104. Feiner, 340 U.S. at 321 (“The findings of the state courts as to the existing
situation and the imminence of greater disorder coupled with petitioner’s
deliberate defiance of the police officers convince us that we should not
reverse this conviction in the name of free speech.”).
105. James Weinstein, Free Speech, Abortion Access, and the Problem of
Judicial Viewpoint Discrimination, 29 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 471, 476 (1996)
(noting “the lack of a precise constitutional rule announced by the [Feiner]
Court”).
106. Cf. City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 465 (1987) (“[W]e have repeatedly
invalidated laws that provide the police with unfettered discretion to arrest
individuals for words . . . that annoy or offend them.”).
107. Cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309 (1939) (“The hearers were in
fact highly offended.”); see also William Drabble, Righteous Torts: Pleasant
Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert and the Free Exercise Defense in Texas,
62 Baylor L. Rev. 267, 270 (2010) (noting that Cantwell’s commun–
ications were offensive).
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permissibly criminalized.108 One would have inferred after Terminiello
that the overbreadth109 of the statute at issue in Feiner would have
resulted in the convictions being vacated.110
An additional point is that the crowd listening to Feiner may not
in fact have been riled up—it seems equally plausible that the one
individual who was upset could have been handled easily by the
police.111 While Feiner had uttered insults, there was no evidence that
those insults were directed at anyone present.112 Finally, if Feiner is
justified because of a reasonable fear of a riot,113 then Terminiello should
108. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 5 (1948) (“We need not consider whether
as construed it is defective in its entirety. As construed and applied it at
least contains parts that are unconstitutional. The verdict was a general one;
and we do not know on this record but what it may rest on the invalid
clauses.”).
109. Cf. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965) (“There is an additional
reason why this conviction cannot be sustained. The statute at issue in this
case, as authoritatively interpreted by the Louisiana Supreme Court, is
unconstitutionally vague in its overly broad scope.”).
110. Cf. Aviva O. Wertheimer, Note, The First Amendment Distinction Between
Conduct and Content: A Conceptual Framework for Understanding Fighting
Words Jurisprudence, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 793, 804 (1994) (“Despite its
recent holding in Terminiello, the Court upheld the conviction [in Feiner].”);
Macklin W. Thornton, Laying Siege to the Ivory Tower: Resource Allocation
in Response to the Heckler’s Veto on University Campuses, 55 San Diego
L. Rev. 673, 697 n.125 (2018) (noting “the change from Terminiello to
Feiner”).
111. See Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 327 (Black, J., dissenting) (“[O]ne
person threatened to assault petitioner but the officers did nothing to dis–
courage this when even a word might have sufficed.”). But see Note,
Blasphemy, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 694, 729 (1970) (“Feiner was convicted of
disorderly conduct only after disorder by his audience seemed imminent as
a result of his speech . . . .”).
112. Feiner, 340 U.S. at 330 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting that a few mayors
and the President were insulted). In addition, Feiner insulted members of
the American Legion. See id. It is not clear whether anyone from the
American Legion was present, and in any event these comments would seem
no more objectionable than those that Cantwell had directed against
Catholicism to two individuals who were in fact Catholic. See Cantwell, 310
U.S. at 303; see also Wertheimer, supra note 110, at 804 (“[T]he defendant,
Feiner, made derogatory remarks about President Truman, local politicians
and the American Legion.”).
113. See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 236 (1963) (citing Feiner, 340
U.S. at 317, 321) (suggesting that Feiner was inciting a riot); Brian J. Levy,
Note, Who Wants to Know—and Why?: The Supreme Court’s Secret
Purposivist Test for Exemptions from Association Membership Disclosure
Laws, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 473, 503 (2012) (“The Supreme Court upheld the
conviction. Emphasizing the danger of violence, the Court concluded that
the arrest was constitutional because the police had the power to prevent a
riot.”).
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certainly have been decided differently, because there was an actual,
easily foreseeable disturbance in the latter case.114
B. Limiting Fighting Words to Exclude the Injury Prong?

In a few fighting words cases, the Court has only considered
whether the words at issue would result in violence rather than look in
addition at whether the words would inflict injury. This has led some
courts and commentators to conclude that the fighting words exception
no longer includes the injury prong.115
Street v. New York116 is sometimes cited as a case limiting the
construction of fighting words doctrine.117 Sidney Street was convicted
of destroying or casting contempt upon a United States flag by word or
deed.118 On the day that Street heard that James Meredith had been

114. See DuBuisson, supra note 83, at 327 (“Terminiello gave a speech to a large
audience in a public meeting hall; outside, an angry crowd of protesters
condemned his speech and created a violent disturbance.”).
115. See, e.g., Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1206 (7th Cir. 1978) (rejecting
that fighting words doctrine includes an “inflicts injury” prong); State v.
Drahota, 788 N.W.2d 796, 806 (Neb. 2010) (“[T]he State cannot criminalize
speech under the fighting words exception solely because it inflicts
emotional injury . . . .”); see also Ronald Turner, Hate Speech and the First
Amendment: The Supreme Court’s R.A.V. Decision, 61 Tenn. L. Rev.
197, 208 (1993) (“[C]ommentators have concluded that the inflict[s] injury
prong of Chaplinsky is no longer good law.”); Ashley Barton, Oh Snap!:
Whether Snapchat Images Qualify As “Fighting Words” Under Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire and How to Address Americans’ Evolving Means of
Communication, 52 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1287, 1305 (2017) (“The Court
perhaps let the inflict[s]-injury prong fall to the wayside.”); Gregory Preves,
The Death Knell for Hate-Crime Laws? The Supreme Court Protects
Unpopular Speech in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 24 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 309,
315 (1993) (“[T]he personal injury prong of Chaplinsky, which never enjoyed
strong support by the Court, is now essentially dead.”); Clay Calvert,
Cohen v. California Turns 40: F--- the Midlife Crisis, Commc’ns Law.,
March 2011, at 5 (“In brief, fighting words today must be conveyed in
direct, one-on-one fashion and be likely to provoke an immediate, violent
response in the context in which they are uttered.”); Brady Coleman,
Shame, Rage and Freedom of Speech: Should the United States Adopt
European “Mobbing” Laws?, 35 Ga. J. Int’l & Compar. L. 53, 82 (2006)
(second alteration in original) (“[M]ost observers believe the first prong of
the Chaplinsky test—excluding from First Amendment protection language
which by its ‘very utterance inflict[s] injury’—has not survived the test of
time.”).
116. 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
117. Donoughe, supra note 2, at 750 (“The Court began to steadily narrow the
grounds on which ‘fighting words’ are held to apply, beginning in 1969 with
Street v. New York.”).
118. Street, 394 U.S. at 578.
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shot,119 Street went outside with a United States flag and burned it.
When asked whether he had burned the flag, he said, “Yes; that is my
flag; I burned it. If they let that happen to Meredith we don’t need an
American flag.”120
Street was convicted under a statute which criminalized both the
burning of the flag and using words to cast contempt upon a United
States flag.121 He argued that the statute was unconstitutional both
because it prohibited his saying certain words122 and because it prohib–
ited his engaging in certain expressive conduct.123 The Court saw no
need to address the latter claim,124 because it held that the statute’s
criminalizing the use of certain words about the American flag was
unconstitutional.125 Because Street’s conviction might well have been
based at least in part upon that unconstitutional provision,126 the
conviction could not stand.127
In reversing the conviction based on an unconstitutional speech
limitation, the Court addressed whether the prohibition targeted words
that fell into one of the recognized exceptions, e.g., fighting words. The
Court reasoned, “Nor could such a conviction be justified on . . . the
possible tendency of appellant’s words to provoke violent retaliation,”128
although the Court conceded that it “it is conceivable that some
listeners might have been moved to retaliate upon hearing appellant’s

119. Id. (“Appellant testified that during the afternoon of June 6, 1966, he was
listening to the radio in his Brooklyn apartment. He heard a news report that
civil rights leader James Meredith had been shot by a sniper in Mississippi.”).
120. Id. at 579.
121. Id. at 577–78 (citing N.Y. Penal Law § 1425, subd. 16 (1909)).
122. Id. at 580.
123. Id. at 580–81 (“[H]e asserts that New York may not constitutionally punish
one who publicly destroys or damages an American flag as a means of protest,
because such an act constitutes expression protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.”).
124. Id. at 581.
125. Id. (“[W]e hold that § 1425, subd. 16, par. d, was unconstitutionally
applied in appellant’s case because it permitted him to be punished merely
for speaking defiant or contemptuous words about the American flag.”).
126. Id. at 590 (“In the face of an information explicitly setting forth appellant’s
words as an element of his alleged crime, and of appellant’s subsequent
conviction under a statute making it an offense to speak words of that sort,
we find this record insufficient to eliminate the possibility either that appell–
ant’s words were the sole basis of his conviction or that appellant was
convicted for both his words and his deed.”).
127. Id. at 594 (“[W]e reverse the judgment of the New York Court of Appeals.”).
128. Id. at 592.

267

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 1·2020
Those Are Fighting Words, Aren’t They?

disrespectful words.”129 Nonetheless, the Court rejected that “appell–
ant’s remarks were so inherently inflammatory as to come within that
small class of ‘fighting words’ which are ‘likely to provoke the average
person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace.’”130 Here,
the Court implied that even if violence had resulted, that would not
have sufficed to establish that Street’s communication fell into the
fighting words exception, because the average person would not have
reacted violently to his words.131
The construction of the fighting words exception in Street does not
include anything about the likelihood that the words would cause injury
to the person at whom they were directed.132 Yet, the Court’s having
failed to include the injury component of fighting words when providing
an analysis in Street may not have been because it was trying to change
the analysis sub rosa133 but, instead, because the Court did not believe
that these words would be viewed as personally insulting and hence did
not believe that the words would plausibly be thought to cause anyone
injury.
The Street Court stated that the words employed simply did not
constitute fighting words.134 But the Court seemed to step back from
that judgment, explaining that even if his speech qualified as fighting
words,135 the statute under which he had been convicted was over–
broad.136
The Street Court addressed a related issue, namely, whether
Street’s language could be regulated based on its offensiveness. The
Court explained, “It is firmly settled that under our Constitution the
129. Id.
130. Id. (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942)); see also
Beverly Weinberg, Treating the Symptom Instead of the Cause: Regulating
Student Speech at the University of Connecticut, 23 Conn. L. Rev. 743, 778
(1991) (“[I]n Street v. New York[,] . . . [t]he Court held that the words used by
the defendant were not so inherently inflammatory as to fall within that small
class of fighting words.”).
131. Street, 394 U.S. at 592.
132. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
133. See Note, supra note 3, at 1129 (“The jurisprudential history of the Chaplinsky
doctrine has led some commentators to conclude that the Court has sub rosa
overruled the entire fighting words doctrine, or at least the ‘inflict injury’
prong.”).
134. See supra notes 125–127 and accompanying text; see also Hurdle, supra
note 3, at 1150 (“Street’s statement did not constitute fighting words
because it was not directed to incite a violent response by any individual.”).
135. Street, 394 U.S. at 592.
136. Id. (“[Section] 1425, subd. 16, par. d, is not narrowly drawn to punish only
words of that character, and there is no indication that it was so interpreted
by the state courts.”).
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public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the
ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers.”137 Here, it was
unclear whether the Court was treating offensiveness as if it might be
part of the fighting words exception138 or, instead, was listing several
possible bases upon which the words might be thought excepted from
First Amendment guarantees and then was discussing why each would
not work.139
Sometimes, when the Court suggests that words do not lose
constitutional protection merely because they are offensive, the Court
seems to be distinguishing between an individual’s feeling hurt and her
feeling offended.140 Insofar as they are different kinds of reactions, the
Court’s suggesting that convictions cannot be based on having caused
offense141 would not also entail that convictions cannot be based on
having hurt someone. In addition, the Court has implicitly disting–
uished between the causes for one’s taking offense—one might be

137. Id.
138. But see Victoria L. Handler, Legislating Social Tolerance: Hate Crimes and
the First Amendment, 13 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol’y 137, 148 (1992)
(“In effect, the [Street] Court had refined the ‘fighting words’ doctrine in
terms of the ‘inflicts injury’ prong to read that the mere effect of offending
or shocking a speaker does not constitute preventable injury.”).
139. The Street Court considered and rejected that the words could be criminalized
because they constituted incitement, fighting words, shocking or offensive
words, or words manifesting a lack of respect for the flag. See Street, 394 U.S.
at 591–92.
140. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 414 (1992) (White, J., concurring)
(“The mere fact that expressive activity causes hurt feelings, offense, or
resentment does not render the expression unprotected.” (citing United
States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 319 (1990))); Amnon Reichman, The
Passionate Expression of Hate: Constitutional Protections, Emotional
Harm and Comparative Law, 31 Fordham Int’l L.J. 76, 123 (2007)
(separately listing hurt feelings and offended sensibilities in an analysis of
the Israeli Court’s free-expression cases). Some comments might cause both
hurt and offense. See Christopher J. Roederer, Free Speech on the Law
School Campus: Is it the Hammer or the Wrecking Ball That Speaks?, 15
U. St. Thomas L.J. 26, 27 (2018) (discussing individuals “who are offended
and hurt by insensitive language”).
141. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011) (“If there is a bedrock
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may
not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea
itself offensive or disagreeable.” (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,
414 (1989))).
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offended by an idea142 or by a personal insult,143 and the First Amend–
ment distinguishes between the two kinds of offense.144
Sometimes, members of the Court do not distinguish between hurt
feelings and offended sensibilities for purposes of the fighting words
doctrine.145 But when the Court is not distinguishing between these, the
kind of offense that is included within fighting words is the kind due to
personal insult rather than an unpopular idea.146
Suppose that the feelings of offense are due to a personal insult
rather than a disagreeable idea.147 Even so, merely because someone has
been offended, however slightly, would not establish that the fighting
words exception had been triggered.148 Presumably, when the Court
talks about the kind of offense that might qualify an expression as
falling with the fighting words category, the Court is including a degree
component—only words causing extreme offense or injury would qual–
ify.149
Two years after Street was issued, the Court decided another case
in which the Court has been interpreted to be limiting the fighting
words exception. Paul Robert Cohen was convicted of disturbing the

142. See Peter E. Quint, The Comparative Law of Flag Desecration: The United
States and the Federal Republic of Germany, 15 Hastings Int’l & Comp.
L. Rev. 613, 614 (1992) (“In 1984 Gregory Lee Johnson, a political protester,
publicly burned an American flag near the Republican National Convention
to express his disapproval of the renomination of President Reagan.”).
143. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309–10 (1940) (“Resort to epi–
thets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of
information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution . . . .”).
144. Cf. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 409 (“No reasonable onlooker would have regarded
Johnson’s generalized expression of dissatisfaction with the policies of the
Federal Government as a direct personal insult or an invitation to exchange
fisticuffs.”).
145. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 414 (White, J., concurring).
146. See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 309–10 (suggesting that insults and epithets are
unprotected).
147. Cf. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 746 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[S]upp–
ression of uncongenial ideas is the worst offense against the First
Amendment.”).
148. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 414 (White, J., concurring) (“The mere fact that
expressive activity causes hurt feelings, offense, or resentment does not render
the expression unprotected.” (citing United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310,
319 (1990))).
149. See infra note 256 and accompanying text (discussing whether the Court
might be saying that the fighting words exception would only be triggered
if the person felt so hurt that she would be tempted to lash out in some
way).
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peace150 when he wore a jacket “bearing the words ‘Fuck the Draft’” in
a courthouse.151 The Court addressed whether wearing such a jacket
could be construed as employing fighting words and thus fall outside of
First Amendment protection.152
The Cohen Court defined fighting words as “those personally
abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as
a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent
reaction.”153 In this case, “the four-letter word displayed by Cohen . . .
was clearly not ‘directed to the person of the hearer.’”154 Thus, because
“[n]o individual actually or likely to be present could reasonably have
regarded the words on appellant’s jacket as a direct personal insult,”155
the fighting words exception had not been met.
There are a variety of reasons that the words on Cohen’s jacket did
not constitute fighting words. For example, the Court citing Cantwell
emphasized that the fighting words have to be directed at the person
who likely would have had the negative response. One commentator
has taken this limitation to mean that for an expression to count as
fighting words, the person in particular must be insulted rather than
simply be a member of a targeted group.156 Even if insults can count as
fighting words when targeting a group of which a hearer157 is a mem–
ber,158 Cohen’s expression was not an insult and was aimed at the public
150. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971) (“Appellant Paul Robert Cohen
was convicted in the Los Angeles Municipal Court of violating that part of
California Penal Code § 415 which prohibits ‘maliciously and willfully
disturb(ing) the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person . . . by . . .
offensive conduct . . . .’”).
151. Id. at 16.
152. See id. at 19–20.
153. Id. at 20.
154. Id. (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309 (1940)).
155. Id.
156. See Massey, supra note 58, at 160 (“It is the right to be free of personal
abuse that is carved out by the exception to free speech created by Cantwell
and Chaplinsky, not a right to be free of abuse that inheres in the status of
the auditor as a member of a social group.”).
157. Here, there were no sounds. Instead, people saw the jacket. Cohen, 403 U.S.
at 16–17. The Cohen Court did not imply that seeing versus hearing the
words was the relevant differentiating feature. While the Cohen Court did
suggest that “[t]hose in the Los Angeles courthouse could effectively avoid
further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes,”
id. at 21, offended hearers might adopt an analogous remedy and cover their
ears. But see Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 773 (1994)
(“[I]t is much easier for the clinic to pull its curtains than for a patient to
stop up her ears . . . .”).
158. Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 298–99 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(“There held to be ‘insulting or “fighting” words’ were calling one a ‘God
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at large rather than at a particular group. Ironically, when noting that
no one was likely be personally insulted, the Court was also explaining
why the “inflicts injury” prong would not have been met, i.e., why this
particular expression did not constitute fighting words even if the
“inflicts injury” prong is included with the exception.159
Cohen underscores some of the lessons of Street. Cohen’s “con–
viction quite clearly rest[ed] upon the asserted offensiveness of the
words Cohen used to convey his message to the public.”160 Indeed, the
statute that he had allegedly violated precluded engaging in “offensive
conduct.”161 However, he had not engaged in conduct but speech,162
which would mean that if his conviction were to stand it would be for
having expressed offensive speech.163
Like the Street Court,164 the Cohen Court examined several excep–
tions under the First Amendment to see if the expression at issue was
immune from First Amendment scrutiny, but found that the expression
on Cohen’s jacket did not fall into any of those categories.165 For
example, the Court noted that “[t]his [was] not . . . an obscenity
case,”166 because “[w]hatever else may be necessary to give rise to the
States’ broader power to prohibit obscene expression, such expression
must be, in some significant way, erotic.”167 The Cohen Court described
fighting words as “those personally abusive epithets which, when
addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common know–
ledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction,”168 but rejected that
this exception was triggered because no one would likely have felt

damned racketeer’ and a ‘damned Fascist.’ Equally inciting and more clearly
‘fighting words,’ when thrown at Catholics and Jews who are rightfully on
the streets of New York, are statements that ‘The Pope is the anti-Christ’
and the Jews are ‘Christ-killers.’ These terse epithets come down to our
generation weighted with hatreds accumulated through centuries of blood–
shed.” (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569, 572, 574
(1942))).
159. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20.
160. Id. at 18 (emphasis omitted).
161. Id. at 16–17.
162. Id. at 18–19.
163. Id. at 19 (“Appellant’s conviction, then, rests squarely upon his exercise of
the ‘freedom of speech’ . . . .”).
164. See supra notes 116–139 and accompanying text.
165. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 19–22.
166. Id. at 20.
167. Id. (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)).
168. Id. (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)).
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personally insulted.169 Cohen’s jacket could not be interpreted as an
attempt to incite. “Nor do we have here an instance of the exercise of
the State’s police power to prevent a speaker from intentionally
provoking a given group to hostile reaction.”170 Basically, the Court
considered a number of possible bases upon which to argue that the
First Amendment was not implicated and rejected each of them.
When excluding the “inflicts injury” prong, the Cohen Court char–
acterized fighting words as those “likely to provoke violent reaction,”171
just as the Street Court had.172 The Cohen Court might have been
attempting to narrow what qualified as fighting words or instead might
have been focusing on violent reactions because it could not take
seriously that the words on Cohen’s back would cause anyone injury.173
If indeed the reason that the Court in Street and Cohen did not include
the personal injury prong of the fighting words exception was that the
Court did not believe that the prong was plausibly implicated in the
cases, then the conclusion that the Court had implicitly modified the
exception would be error.174
If courts and commentators were correct that the Court had excised
the “inflicts injury” prong, one would not expect the Court to include
that prong in future cases when discussing the fighting words excep–
tion.175 Yet, in the year following Cohen, the Court again considered a
fighting words case, although this one involved language directed at a
particular individual during a contentious confrontation.176 Johnny
Wilson was convicted “on two counts of using opprobrious words and
abusive language.”177 Wilson had said to a police officer, “‘White son of
a bitch, I’ll kill you’ and ‘You son of a bitch, I’ll choke you to death.’”178
169. See id.
170. Id. (citing Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951)).
171. Id. (citing Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. 568).
172. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
173. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20 (“No individual actually or likely to be present could
reasonably have regarded the words on appellant’s jacket as a direct
personal insult.”).
174. But see Mannheimer, supra note 17, at 1539–40 (quoting Chaplinsky, 315
U.S. at 572) (“Cohen reflected a heavily contextual approach [because] it
restricted the prong of the fighting words doctrine directed at those words
that ‘by their very utterance inflict injury’ in favor of the prong directed
at words that ‘tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.’”).
175. See infra notes 176–211 and accompanying text (discussing Gooding and
Lewis).
176. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 519 n.1 (1972) (quoting Wilson v. State,
156 S.E.2d 446, 449–50 (Ga. 1967)).
177. Id. at 518.
178. Id. at 534 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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In addition, he had said to another officer, “You son of a bitch, if you
ever put your hands on me again, I’ll cut you all to pieces.”179
When deciding whether the conviction should be affirmed, the
Court focused on the breadth of the statute, noting that “the statute
must be carefully drawn or be authoritatively construed to punish only
unprotected speech and not be susceptible of application to protected
expression.”180 The Court implied that Wilson’s language could itself
have been prohibited under a narrowly drawn statute,181 but that the
statute under which he was convicted was unconstitutionally broad.182
However, the fighting words test cited in Gooding includes the “inflicts
injury” prong,183 which one would not have expected if the Court had
modified the applicable test.
The reason that the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad in
Gooding is important to note. When defining the words that might
cause a breach of the peace, the Court made clear that the state is not
permitted to refuse to consider factors that would decrease the
likelihood that an actual breach will take place.184 This qualification is
important and modifies the fighting words analysis offered in Chaplin–
sky—even if it were true that the average person would have thought
“Fascist” a fighting word,185 use of that word on that occasion did not
seem at all likely to have resulted in a violent response.186
The Gooding Court gave examples of Georgia courts that had failed
to take into account evidence that violence was not likely to result.187
For example, one court suggested that words might be prohibited if
they might cause a breach of the peace even if on a particular occasion
179. Id.
180. Id. at 522 (majority opinion).
181. Id. at 520 (“It matters not that the words appellee used might have been
constitutionally prohibited under a narrowly and precisely drawn statute.”).
182. See id. at 527 (“This definition makes it a ‘breach of peace’ merely to speak
words offensive to some who hear them, and so sweeps too broadly. . . .
[The statute], as construed, does not define the standard of responsibility
with requisite narrow specificity.” (first quoting Street v. New York, 394
U.S. 576, 592 (1969); and then citing Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195
(1966) and Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965))).
183. See id. at 522 (“Appellant does not challenge these principles but contends
that the Georgia statute is narrowly drawn to apply only to a constitutionally
unprotected class of words—‘fighting’ words—‘those which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.’”
(citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942))).
184. Id. at 520–22.
185. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
187. Gooding, 405 U.S. at 525–27.
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the words were “addressed to one who, on account of circumstances or
by virtue of the obligations of office, cannot actually then and there
resent the same by a breach of the peace.”188 Thus, if a policeman
because of good training or the responsibilities of office would not have
responded with violence, the relevant standard would not have been
met.
A different Georgia court had suggested that breaching the peace
involves “disturbing the public peace or tranquility enjoyed by the
citizens of a community.”189 But, the Gooding Court noted, such a
construction “makes it a ‘breach of peace’ merely to speak words
offensive to some who hear them, and so sweeps too broadly.”190
Basically, because the Georgia courts had interpreted the fighting words
exception to involve the kinds of words that might as a general matter
bring about a violent reaction even if in the particular case at hand
there was no likelihood that there would be a violent reaction, the
Georgia statute was including too much speech and thus could not
survive constitutional review.191
The Gooding Court’s failure to analyze whether the “inflicts injury”
prong had been met does not establish that the doctrine has been
modified to exclude that prong.192 Whether or not that prong was
included, the Gooding Court was suggesting that the statute prohibited
too much speech because of the failure to take into account factors
indicating that no violence would in fact occur even when the average
person would say that the language used would likely result in vio–
188. Id. at 526 (citing Elmore v. State, 83 S.E. 799, 799 (Ga. Ct. App. 1914)).
189. Id. at 527 (citing Samuels v. State, 118 S.E.2d 231, 232 (Ga. Ct. App.
1961)).
190. Id. (citing Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969)).
191. See id. at 528 (“Because earlier appellate decisions applied § 26–6303 to
utterances where there was no likelihood that the person addressed would
make an immediate violent response, it is clear that the standard allowing
juries to determine guilt ‘measured by common understanding and practice’
does not limit the application of § 26–6303 to ‘fighting’ words defined by
Chaplinsky.”).
192. State v. Drahota, 788 N.W.2d 796, 802 (Neb. 2010) (alteration in original)
(footnotes omitted) (“Similarly, in Gooding v. Wilson, the Court held that
a breach of the peace statute was overbroad because it was not limited to
fighting words. The Court reasoned that because the statute could be applied
‘to utterances where there was no likelihood that the person addressed would
make an immediate violent response, it is clear that [the statute is not
limited] to “fighting” words defined by Chaplinsky.’ In effect, the Gooding
Court read the ‘inflict injury’ prong out of the definition. Lower courts have
followed the Supreme Court’s lead. ‘It is now clear that words must do more
than offend, cause indignation or anger the addressee to lose the protection
of the First Amendment.’” (first quoting Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518,
528 (1972); and then quoting Hammond v. Adkisson, 536 F.2d 237, 239 (8th
Cir. 1976))).
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lence.193 Because the statute was overbroad, the Court did not need to
address, for example, whether the statute was too broad for yet another
reason because it would provide the basis for a conviction even though
the officer had not felt injured to the requisite extent.194
The Gooding Court held that a regulation is overbroad if it permits
speech to be regulated merely because in some circumstances such
speech might result in violence, where there was no reason to believe
that the speech would result in violence on that particular occasion.195
But if there has to be reason to believe that violence will result on a
particular occasion, then the Court was including two conditions within
its fighting words analysis of imminent violence: (1) the speech has to
be the kind of language that people of common intelligence would know
would result in an immediate breach of the peace,196 and (2) the
language had to be likely to cause a breach in the particular context in
which it was communicated.197
While the Court did not offer a separate analysis of the “inflicts
injury” prong, the Court might have used an analogous two-part test
when seeking to apply this prong: (1) the speech has to be the kind of
language that people of common intelligence would know would likely
result in an injury (of sufficient severity),198 and (2) the language had
193. Some commentators fail to appreciate that the overbreadth of the statute
meant that the Court did not have to decide whether the speech at issue
qualified under the “inflicts injury” prong, just as the Court did not have
to decide whether this speech qualified under the words that will cause an
immediate violent response prong. See Friedlieb, supra note 4, at 390 (citing
Gooding, 405 U.S. at 519, 528) (“[I]n Gooding v[.] Wilson, the Court struck
down a Georgia law banning ‘opprobrious words or abusive language’
because it was applied in a case where no likelihood existed of an immediate
violent response. Thus, the Court held that the law was unconstitutional
because it merely banned speech that ‘inflicted injury’ without the accom–
panying threat of a breach of the peace.”).
194. An officer hearing this might not have felt injured but threatened. See
William Cohen, A Look Back at Cohen v. California, 34 UCLA L. Rev.
1595, 1605 (1987) (“Gooding . . . did not resolve the question of whether,
in appropriate circumstances, threats or profanity aimed at police officers
could still be punished under the Chaplinsky theory.”).
195. Gooding, 405 U.S. at 527. Ironically, there was violence on that occasion,
although that violence was not caused by the verbal exchange. See Wilson
v. State, 156 S.E.2d 446, 449 (Ga. 1967) (“The officers attempted to remove
them from the door, and a scuffle ensued.”).
196. See Gooding, 405 U.S. at 523 (quoting State v. Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d 754, 762
(N.H. 1941) (“The test is what men of common intelligence would under–
stand would be words likely to cause an average addressee to fight.”)).
197. See id. at 525–27; see also Hurdle, supra note 3, at 1152–53 (“The Gooding
Court also utilized the Cohen actual addressee standard to determine whether
speech would incite violence.”).
198. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
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to be likely to cause injury to the person to whom it was actually
addressed.199
In Lewis v. City of New Orleans,200 the Court again addressed
whether the use of opprobrious language could be prohibited. There was
conflicting testimony about what happened.201 The officer testified that
Mallie Lewis had said, “[Y]ou god damn m. f. police.”202 Justice
Blackmun in his dissent argued that “[t]he speech uttered by Mrs. Lewis
to the arresting officer ‘plainly’ was profane, ‘plainly’ it was insulting,
and ‘plainly’ it was fighting. It therefore is within the reach of the
ordinance, as narrowed by Louisiana’s highest court.”203 However, the
Lewis Court focused on the breadth of the relevant statute, which read:
“It shall be unlawful and a breach of the peace for any person wantonly
to curse or revile or to use obscene or opprobrious language toward or
with reference to any member of the city police while in the actual
performance of his duty.”204
The Louisiana Supreme Court construed the relevant statute as
“narrowed to ‘fighting words’ uttered to specific persons at a specific
time . . . .”205 But the United States Supreme Court reasoned that the
statute “plainly has a broader sweep than the constitutional definition
of ‘fighting words’ announced in Chaplinsky . . . and reaffirmed in
Gooding . . . , namely, ‘those (words) which by their very utterance
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”206 The
Louisiana Supreme Court had explained that “[p]ermitting the cursing
or reviling of or using obscene or opprobrious words to a police officer
while in the actual performance of his duty would be unreasonable and
basically incompatible with the officer’s activities and the place where
199. Cf. State v. DeLoreto, 827 A.2d 671, 684 (Conn. 2003) (“[N]or are true
threats typical of contemporary manners such that we should expect police
officers to have a ‘thick skin.’”). However, police officers are not expected
to have a thick skin about some things, e.g., threats to physical safety. See
id. (“A police officer is not trained to be fearless in the face of a credible
threat that he will be the victim of a crime, and we can perceive of no reason
that he should be . . . .”).
200. 415 U.S. 130 (1974).
201. Id. at 138 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“Appellant’s and the officer’s respective
versions of the incident are conflicting . . . .”).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 141.
204. Id. at 132 (majority opinion) (quoting New Orleans, La., M.C.S. § 49–7
(1956)).
205. Id. (citing City of New Orleans v. Lewis, 269 So. 2d 450, 456 (La. 1972),
rev’d, 415 U.S. 130 (1974)).
206. Id. (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) and
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 522 (1972)).
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such activities are performed.”207 But that would include words that,
while making the officer uncomfortable, would not likely lead to
violence and might well not be viewed as personal insults.208 In his
concurrence in the result, Justice Powell noted that it was “unlikely . . .
that the words said to have been used here would have precipitated a
physical confrontation between the middle-aged woman who spoke
them and the police officer in whose presence they were uttered.”209
If the Lewis Court had needed to apply the “inflicts injury” prong,
then the Court might have had to decide whether a “god damn m. f.
police” 210 should be viewed as “a harmless letting off of steam”211 rather
than as a personal insult. Or, the Court might have recognized the
expression as an insult but might have thought the insult insufficiently
extreme to qualify under the relevant standard. That might be because
being called such a name was not considered sufficiently injurious to
qualify.212 Or, the Court might have been qualifying the personal insult
prong just as it had qualified the fighting words prong, reasoning that
just as police (because of good training or good self-control) might not

207. Id. (quoting Lewis, 269 So. 2d at 456).
208. Id. at 133 (“At the least, the proscription of the use of ‘opprobrious lan–
guage,’ embraces words that do not ‘by their very utterance inflict injury
or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.’” (quoting Gooding v.
Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 522 (1972))).
209. Id. at 135 (Powell, J., concurring).
210. Id. at 138 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
211. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 568 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring).
212. Courts sometimes must decide whether the use of epithets are sufficiently
extreme or outrageous to qualify for purposes of an intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim. Compare Margita v. Diamond Mortg. Corp., 406
N.W.2d 268, 271 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (“[A] panel of this Court found that
racial epithets in the course of throwing the plaintiff out of the defendant’s
retail store could be considered extreme and outrageous conduct under the
circumstances.” (citing Ledsinger v. Burmeister, 318 N.W.2d 558, 562 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1982))), with Graham ex rel. Graham v. Guilderland Cent. Sch.
Dist., 681 N.Y.S.2d 831, 833 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (Cardona, P.J.,
dissenting) (discussing “case law wherein the use of racial slurs and epithets
has been held not to constitute the type of extreme and outrageous conduct
necessary to sustain a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress” (citing Herlihy v. Metro. Museum of Art, 633 N.Y.S.2d 106 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1996) and Leibowitz v. Bank Leumi Tr. Co. of N.Y., 548 N.Y.S.2d
513 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989))), Herlihy, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 113–14 (finding that
falsely accusing someone of being a user of racial slurs “does not rise to the
level of outrage required to recover under a cause of action that is limited to
only the most egregious of acts”), and Leibowitz, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 521 (finding
that the use of religious and ethnic slurs “in this case did not rise to such an
extreme or outrageous level as to meet the threshold requirements for”
intentional infliction of emotional distress).
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respond with fisticuffs to words that might provoke others,213 police
might also be trained to become inured to such comments rather than
find them deeply offensive and harmful.214
The Court in City of Houston v. Hill addressed “whether a
municipal ordinance that makes it unlawful to interrupt a police officer
in the performance of his or her duties is unconstitutionally overbroad
under the First Amendment.”215 Noting that “[t]he Houston ordinance
is much more sweeping than the municipal ordinance struck down in
Lewis,”216 the Court concluded that the ordinance was substantially
overbroad and unconstitutional.217 The Court saw no need to ask the
state courts to construe the statute, believing the ordinance “not
susceptible to a limiting construction because . . . its language is plain
and its meaning unambiguous.”218

213. Lewis, 415 U.S. at 135 (Powell, J., concurring) (“[A] properly trained officer
may reasonably be expected to ‘exercise a higher degree of restraint’ than
the average citizen, and thus be less likely to respond belligerently to ‘fighting
words.’” (quoting Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 408 U.S. 901, 913 (1972)
(Powell, J., concurring))).
214. See Resek v. City of Huntington Beach, 41 F. App’x 57, 59 (9th Cir. 2002)
(“Along with good judgment, intelligence, alertness, and courage, the job
of police officers requires a thick skin. Theirs is not a job for people whose
feelings are easily hurt.”); Commonwealth v. Hock, 728 A.2d 943, 947 (Pa.
1999) (“We recognize that the police often place their lives in jeopardy to
ensure the safety of the citizenry and thus perform a task that is valuable,
necessary and, at times, heroic. Accordingly, the prospect of a citizen
verbally abusing a police officer appears particularly objectionable. It does
not follow, however, that Section 5503(a) may be used as a vehicle to
protect the police from all verbal indignities, especially under the dubious
hypothesis that officers are likely to break the law when affronted. The
police must expect that, as part of their jobs, they will be exposed to daily
contact with distraught individuals in emotionally charged situations.”);
see also Frank Rudy Cooper, “Who’s the Man?”: Masculinities Studies,
Terry Stops, and Police Training, 18 Colum. J. Gender & L. 671, 735
n.348 (2009) (quoting James J. Fyfe, Training to Reduce Police-Civilian
Violence, in And Justice for All: Understanding and Controlling
Police Abuse of Force 163, 164 (William A. Geller & Hans Toch eds.,
1995)) (discussing training designed to help police not personalize insults
directed towards them).
215. 482 U.S. 451, 453 (1987).
216. Id. at 462.
217. Id. at 467.
218. Id. at 468.
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Cantwell,219 Terminiello,220 Street,221 Cohen,222 Gooding,223 Lewis,224
and Houston225 all involved statutes that were overbroad. For the first
time in a fighting words case, the R.A.V. Court struck down a statute
because it was too narrow.226
In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, the Court examined the consti–
tutionality of the following statute:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object,
appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited
to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has
reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment
in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender
commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a mis–
demeanor.227

The Minnesota Supreme Court had construed the “modifying
phrase ‘arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others’ [as] limit[ing] the
reach of the ordinance to conduct that amounts to ‘fighting words,’ i.e.,
‘conduct that itself inflicts injury or tends to incite immediate
violence.’”228 The R.A.V. Court noted that it was “bound by the
construction given to it by the Minnesota court,”229 i.e., that the statute
merely prohibits “conduct that itself inflicts injury or tends to incite
immediate violence.”230
Yet, it might be noted that the Court’s options were not as limited
by the Minnesota Supreme Court’s construction as the R.A.V. opinion
implied. The Louisiana Supreme Court had interpreted the statute at

219. See supra notes 35–80 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 81–97 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 116–139 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 150–174 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 176–197 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 200–214 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 215–218 and accompanying text.
226. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (“The First Amendment
does not permit St. Paul to impose special prohibitions on those speakers
who express views on disfavored subjects.” (citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991))).
227. Id. at 380 (quoting St. Paul, Minn., Legis. Code § 292.02 (1983)).
228. Id. (citing In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 510 (Minn. 1991),
rev’d sub nom. R.A.V., 505 U.S. 377).
229. Id. at 381.
230. Id. at 380 (citing In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d at 510).
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issue in Lewis as confined to fighting words,231 and the Lewis Court had
nonetheless held that the statute was overbroad.232 Nonetheless, the
United States Supreme Court accepted the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
conclusion that the statute only barred fighting words and came to the
paradoxical conclusion that even if “all of the expression reached by the
ordinance is proscribable under the ‘fighting words’ doctrine, [the
Court] nonetheless conclude[s] that the ordinance is facially unconsti–
tutional in that it prohibits otherwise permitted speech solely on the
basis of the subjects the speech addresses.”233
The R.A.V. Court explained that “the ordinance applies only to
‘fighting words’ that insult, or provoke violence, ‘on the basis of race,
color, creed, religion or gender,’”234 which meant that fighting words on
other bases such as political affiliation, sexual orientation, or union
membership were not in addition proscribed.235 Yet, it is at best
misleading to suggest that these other expressions were “otherwise per–
mitted,”236 because there was another Minnesota statute prohibiting
speech that constituted fighting words.237 Here, presumably, the com–
plaint was that this statute criminalized certain fighting words but not
others which means that a particular statute would have to either ban
all fighting words or none at all.238
The R.A.V. Court offered an exception to this all-or-none rule:
“[w]hen the basis for the content discrimination consists entirely of the
very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable, no

231. Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 132 (noting that the Louisiana
Supreme Court “took the position that, as written, ‘[the statute] is narrowed
to “fighting words” uttered to specific persons at a specific time’” (quoting
City of New Orleans v. Lewis, 269 So. 2d 450, 456 (La. 1972))).
232. Id. at 134 (“Since § 49-7, as construed by the Louisiana Supreme Court, is
susceptible of application to protected speech, the section is constitutionally
overbroad and therefore is facially invalid.”); see also R.A.V., 505 U.S. at
412–13 (White, J., concurring) (citing Lewis, 415 U.S. at 132–33) (“We have
stricken legislation when the construction supplied by the state court failed
to cure the overbreadth problem.”).
233. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 381 (emphasis added).
234. Id. at 391.
235. See id. (“Those who wish to use ‘fighting words’ in connection with other
ideas—to express hostility, for example, on the basis of political affiliation,
union membership, or homosexuality—are not covered.”).
236. Id. at 381.
237. See Minn. Stat. § 609.72 (2019), invalidated by State v. Hensel, 901
N.W.2d 166, 169 (Minn. 2017).
238. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 419 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Within a particular
‘proscribable’ category of expression, the Court holds, a government must
either proscribe all speech or no speech at all.”).
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significant danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination exists.”239 Thus,
the Court explained, “A State might choose to prohibit only that
obscenity which is the most patently offensive in its prurience—i.e.,
that which involves the most lascivious displays of sexual activity.”240
Yet, one would have thought that St. Paul might have thought these
fighting words especially important to proscribe, which presumably
would mean that the announced exception had been met in this case.241
For purposes here, though, the R.A.V. analysis is noteworthy for a
few additional reasons. The case involved an attempted cross burning
in the yard of an African-American family.242 The attempt was made
sometime between 1:00 a.m. and 3:00 a.m.243
The incident was described in the following way:
Early on June 21, 1990, Russ and Laura Jones, an AfricanAmerican couple with five children who had recently moved to a
predominantly white, working-class neighborhood in St. Paul,
Minnesota, awoke to the sound of voices in their front yard.
Looking outside, the Jones family saw in their fenced-in yard a
small burning cross, a device long associated with the racist
tactics of the Ku Klux Klan. Fearing for their safety, the family
called the police.244

Waking to discover a burning cross in the yard would be terrify–
ing.245 For fighting words analysis, however, there was no hint that any
member of the family was even tempted to confront these perpetrators
with violence, so the fighting words exception would not have been
239. Id. at 388 (majority opinion).
240. Id.
241. See id. at 407 (White, J., concurring) (“This selective regulation reflects
the city’s judgment that harms based on race, color, creed, religion, or
gender are more pressing public concerns than the harms caused by other
fighting words.”).
242. Id. at 379 (“In the predawn hours of June 21, 1990, petitioner and several
other teenagers allegedly assembled a crudely made cross by taping together
broken chair legs. They then allegedly burned the cross inside the fenced
yard of a black family that lived across the street from the house where
petitioner was staying.”).
243. In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 508 (Minn. 1991) (“The City of
St. Paul alleges that between 1:00 a.m. and 3:00 a.m. on June 21, 1990,
R.A.V. participated in burning a cross inside the fenced yard of an African
American family’s home.”), rev’d sub nom. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377 (1992).
244. Thomas H. Moore, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul: A Curious Way to Protect
Free Speech, 71 N.C. L. Rev. 1252, 1256 (1993) (footnotes omitted).
245. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 380 n.1 (noting that there might have been a terror
prosecution).
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triggered. Even if the Minnesota Supreme Court was construing the
ordinance narrowly, there was no likelihood that this particular
expression would have resulted in the targeted individual responding
violently, so one would have thought that, following Gooding246 and
Lewis,247 this conviction could not stand.
The Minnesota Supreme Court had defined fighting words as “those
which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an imme–
diate breach of the peace,”248 which the United States Supreme Court
cited with approval.249 But if the “inflict injury” prong had officially
been dropped,250 then the Minnesota construction would have been
overbroad and subject to reversal.251 In his concurrence in the judgment,
Justice White suggested that the statute was overbroad, not because
the “inflicts injury” component was included but because the Minnesota
court had failed to specify which injuries were included and which not.252
When analyzing fighting words, the Court has included the “inflicts
injury” prong even after R.A.V.253 The Alvarez Court cited Chaplinsky
with approval, noting Chaplinsky’s exception from First Amendment
246. See supra notes 176–197 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 200–214 and accompanying text.
248. In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d at 510 (emphasis added) (quoting
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
249. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 381.
250. But see Barton, supra note 115, at 1303 (noting that “the Supreme Court
has never explicitly addressed whether the inflict-injury arm was mere sur–
plusage”).
251. See supra notes 200–218 and accompanying text (discussing the overbroad
statutes struck down in Lewis and Hill).
252. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 413 (White, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (“[T]he
Minnesota court was far from clear in identifying the ‘injur[ies]’ inflicted by
the expression that St. Paul sought to regulate.”).
253. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003); see also Snyder v. Phelps,
562 U.S. 443, 465 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“This Court has recognized
that words may ‘by their very utterance inflict injury’ and that the First
Amendment does not shield utterances that form ‘no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that
any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality.’” (citing Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572)).
Texas v. Johnson and Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell provide earlier
examples. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989) (“Nor does Johnson’s
expressive conduct fall within that small class of ‘fighting words’ that are
‘likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a
breach of the peace.’ [Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 574]. No reasonable onlooker
would have regarded Johnson’s generalized expression of dissatisfaction
with the policies of the Federal Government as a direct personal insult or
an invitation to exchange fisticuffs.”); Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485
U.S. 46, 56 (1988).
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protection of “so-called ‘fighting words.’”254 In Brown v. Entertainment
Merchants Ass’n, the Court included fighting words within the “welldefined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Consti–
tutional problem.”255
One would expect that the Court would be very careful when
describing this “well-defined and narrowly limited class[] of speech.”256
Regrettably, when analyzing the fighting words category, the Court has
been inconsistent with respect to what the criteria are and how they
should be applied.257 The Court sometimes includes an injury compon–
ent in the test but has neither applied it nor limited its application.258
In most if not all of the cases in which the Court has struck down
applications of the fighting words test, the Court has interpreted the
statute under which the individual was convicted to be overbroad
because of prohibiting too much speech, e.g., speech that invites
dispute259 or perhaps that is offensive.260 But the statutes having been
overbroad in any event has meant that there was no need for the Court
to announce that the “inflicts injury” prong has been excised.261 By the
254. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (citing Chaplinsky, 315
U.S. at 571–72).
255. 564 U.S. 786, 791 (2011) (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72); see also
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007) (Thomas. J., concurring)
(quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72).
256. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72.
257. Compare supra notes 219–225 and accompanying text, with supra notes
226–233 and accompanying text.
258. See supra Part II(B).
259. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 5 (1948).
260. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 527 (1972) (“This definition makes it a
‘breach of peace’ merely to speak words offensive to some who hear them, and
so sweeps too broadly.”).
261. Some of the lower federal courts have noted that the injury prong has been
included by the Court. See Wilson v. Attaway, 757 F.2d 1227, 1246 (11th
Cir. 1985) (“Whether words are ‘fighting’ words, that is, words ‘which by
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of
the peace,’ . . . depends ‘upon the circumstances of their utterance.’” (first
citing Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572; and then citing Lewis v. City of New
Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 135 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring))); Knight Riders
of Ku Klux Klan v. City of Cincinnati, 72 F.3d 43, 46 (6th Cir. 1995) (“[I]f
a reasonable onlooker would regard the expressive conduct ‘as a direct
personal insult or an invitation to exchange fisticuffs,’ it is not entitled to
First Amendment protection.” (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409
(1989))); Sandul v. Larion, 119 F.3d 1250, 1255 (6th Cir. 1997) (“Sandul’s
words and actions do not rise to the level of fighting words. The actions were
not likely to inflict injury or to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”);
McDermott v. Royal, 213 F. App’x 500, 502 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Specifically,
in City of Houston v. Hill, [482 U.S. 451, 461–62 (1987)], the Supreme Court

284

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 1·2020
Those Are Fighting Words, Aren’t They?

same token, however, the Court did not need to construe the nonexcised “inflicts injury” component (because the statutes were over–
broad in any case262), so it is unclear whether that prong is still included
in the fighting words test or how significant an injury must be sustained
before that part of the fighting words test has been triggered or even
whether the only kind of injury that would count would be one that
was so severe as to invite an immediate violent response.263
The Court has sometimes required that the expression be of the
kind that would invite an immediate breach of the peace and would in
fact be likely to bring about a breach of the peace,264 but at other times
has only required that the speech be of the “correct” sort without
examining whether in fact violence was likely to occur.265 The Court’s
approach to the “inflicts injury” prong and to the conditions under
which the fighting words exception has been met is regrettable,
especially where the Court has insisted that the relevant statutes not
be overbroad. If the Court were serious about enforcing the overbreadth
prohibition and if the “inflicts injury” prong had been removed from
the test, then one would have expected to Court to strike as overbroad
any construction incorporating the “inflicts injury” component. The
Court’s having failed to do so casts doubt on what the proper standard
is or, perhaps, on the Court’s insistence that statutes not be over–
broad.266

clarified that the First Amendment protects verbal criticism and challenge,
including profanity, directed to police officers unless the speech consists of
‘fighting words,’ namely, words that themselves inflict injury or incite
immediate breach of the peace.”); see also Sambo’s Rests., Inc. v. City of
Ann Arbor, 663 F.2d 686, 697 (6th Cir. 1981) (Keith, J., dissenting) (“The
Supreme Court has held, however, that some types of speech are not worthy
of First Amendment protection. ‘Fighting words’ are included in the category
of unprotected speech. . . . [T]he Supreme Court defined ‘fighting words’ as
‘those (words) which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite
an immediate breach of the peace.’” (citing Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572)).
262. See supra notes 192–195 and accompanying text.
263. See Purtell v. Mason, 527 F.3d 615, 624 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Although the
‘inflict-injury’ alternative in Chaplinsky’s definition of fighting words has
never been expressly overruled, the Supreme Court has never held that the
government may, consistent with the First Amendment, regulate or punish
speech that causes emotional injury but does not have a tendency to pro–
voke an immediate breach of the peace.”).
264. See supra notes 176–214 and accompanying text (discussing Gooding and
Lewis).
265. See supra notes 10–74 and accompanying text (discussing Chaplinsky).
266. See supra notes 104–114 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s
failure to vacate Feiner’s conviction under an overbroad statute).
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II. State Applications
The United States Supreme Court’s contradictory signals about
fighting words has led the state courts to develop different approaches
to the kinds of expressions that might be prohibited. The difficulty
thereby posed is not that state laws differ but that federal constitutional
guarantees are being interpreted in different ways in different juris–
dictions. Individuals who say the same words in identical contexts are
subject to prosecution in some states but not in others, even though
the applicable protections (under the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution) should provide the same protection in all of the
states.
A. State Courts with More Robust Fighting Words Exceptions

The state courts have implicitly recognized the United States
Supreme Court’s ambivalence with respect to which expressions count
as fighting words and are thus subject to regulation. For example, the
Court’s continued citation of Chaplinsky without qualification267 sug–
gests that the test offered in Chaplinsky is still good law. Some states
employ the Chaplinsky approach where it is not necessary to establish
that an imminent breach of the peace is likely to occur in the very
circumstances in which the expression is communicated.268
When discussing why a particular defendant’s language was crimin–
alizable under the fighting words exception, the Connecticut Supreme
Court noted that “[t]he cumulative force of this evidence leads to the
conclusion that the defendant’s language could have aroused a violent
reaction by not only Montigny, but also the crowd.”269 In this case, the

267. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012); Brown v. Ent. Merchs.
Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 791 (2011); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003);
see also Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2312 (2019) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (second alteration in original)
(citations omitted from quote) (“In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, for
example, the Court accepted the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s narrowing
of a state statute covering ‘any offensive, derisive or annoying word’ to reach
only those words that would strike the average person as being ‘plainly likely
to cause a breach of the peace by the addressee[.]’ ‘[T]hus construed,’ this
Court decided, the statute did not violate the right to free speech.” (citing
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569, 573 (1942))); Snyder v.
Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 465 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“This Court has
recognized that words may ‘by their very utterance inflict injury’ and that
the First Amendment does not shield utterances that form ‘no essential part
of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth
that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality.’” (citing Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 57)).
268. See supra notes 25–36 and accompanying text.
269. State v. Szymkiewicz, 678 A.2d 473, 479 (Conn. 1996) (emphasis added).
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individuals were physically present where the words were uttered.270
However, when the defendant was swearing,271 she was in handcuffs and
being led away by a policemen.272 There was no indication that either
the police officer or the store detective was even tempted to engage in
fisticuffs with the defendant.273 By the same token, the Iowa Supreme
Court construed certain objectionable words as fighting words, even
though they had been articulated while on the telephone so there was
no danger of an immediate physical altercation taking place when the
words were uttered.274
The Montana Supreme Court criticized the idea that the fighting
words characterization should depend upon the person at whom they
were directed.275 The court explained, “Were we to adopt this ‘who is
likely to respond belligerently’ rationale, any troglodyte could wander
the streets calling young children and old men ‘f* * * * * * pigs’ because,
due to their age or infirmity, they, like the well-trained policeman, will
not be able to respond in a violent fashion.”276 But the question here is
270. Id. at 476.
271. Id.
272. See id. at 475.
273. Id. at 476.
274. Tim O’Neill Chevrolet, Inc. v. Forristall, 551 N.W.2d 611, 617 (Iowa 1996)
(“We think a fact-finder could easily characterize ‘dishonest,’ ‘dead beat,’ and
‘liar’ as ‘fighting words’ because they attack a person’s integrity. We think
any reasonable person would conclude that their very utterance would tend
to incite an immediate breach of the peace. And such conclusion is not
lessened by the fact that the words were uttered in a telephone conver–
sation.”). But see State v. Dugan, 303 P.3d 755, 767 (Mont. 2013) (“We agree
with the proposition that ‘there is little likelihood of an immediate breach of
the peace when one can abruptly hang up the receiver.’” (citing Walker v.
Dillard, 523 F.2d 3, 5 n.7 (4th Cir. 1975))); State v. Correa, 222 P.3d 1, 8–9
(N.M. 2009) (“It is also significant that Defendant’s taunting, even though
his words may have been threatening, occurred at a distance. The amount of
provocation created by Defendant’s words might have been greater if Defen–
dant were closer to the officers. In this case, Defendant refused to leave his
porch, indicating that he feared or sought to avoid actual confrontation with
the officers. Indeed, Officer Townsend testified that the officers were waiting
for Defendant to come outside so that they could place him under arrest for
disorderly conduct. If Defendant had advanced beyond his porch or physically
threatened the officers, they would have seized upon the opportunity to arrest
him.”).
275. State v. Robinson, 82 P.3d 27, 31 (Mont. 2003) (“[W]e fail to see the logic in
concluding that words (such as ‘f* * * * * * pig’) may or may not be deemed
‘fighting words’ depending upon the intended recipient. If the object is a fellow
citizen, they are considered fighting words. If, on the other hand, the object
is a police officer, who, if well-trained to exercise restraint, will be less likely
to respond belligerently, the words are somehow less provocative.”).
276. Id. The South Dakota Supreme Court has taken the opposite approach. See
State v. Suhn, 759 N.W.2d 546, 550 (S.D. 2008) (“The circuit court’s findings
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not whether as a matter of public policy those unwilling to engage in
fisticuffs should be subject to nasty and insulting comments, but
whether the First Amendment protects such speech, negative implic–
ations for peaceful people notwithstanding.
B. State Courts with More Restricted Fighting Words Exceptions

Other state courts have limited the fighting words exception,
reading Supreme Court precedent to require a substantial likelihood
that the imminent breach of the peace will occur in the very circum–
stances in which the expression occurs.277 Expressions that are generally
understood to qualify as fighting words will nonetheless not provide the
basis for a disturbing the peace conviction if uttered in a context where
violence is unlikely to occur.
The Washington Supreme Court offered a test that is both cate–
gorical and context dependent. The court suggested that for a particular
expression to count as fighting words “when a civilian is the address–
ee,”278 the following test would be used: “[A]n objective test must be
applied to evaluate the words spoken. But to pass constitutional
muster, the court in applying the test must look at the words in the
actual context or situation in which they were said.”279
The case involved Camby, a restaurant patron, who had been asked
to leave the restaurant following other patrons’ complaints.280 Camby
told the doorman, Gray, that he (Camby) was going to take him (Gray)
outside and “kick [his] ass.”281 Gray asked a policeman for assistance,
and the policeman also asked Camby to leave.282 When Camby repeated

do not support a conclusion that Suhn’s words were ‘fighting words.’ The
circuit court simply relied on its findings that one person might have ‘taken
offense,’ been sensitive to, or been ‘offended’ by Suhn’s epithet to the police.
In this context, the circuit court concluded that words constituted ‘fighting
words,’ unprotected by the First Amendment. We disagree. Just because
someone may have been offended, annoyed, or even angered by Suhn’s words
does not make them fighting words. As offensive or abusive as Suhn’s invective
to the police may have been, ‘when addressed to the ordinary citizen,’ Suhn’s
words were not ‘inherently likely to provoke violent reaction.’ The circuit court
erred in determining that Suhn’s utterances were unprotected speech.” (citing
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971))).
277. See e.g., City of Seattle v. Camby, 701 P.2d 499, 501 (Wash. 1985); In re
Nickolas S., 245 P.3d 446, 451 (Ariz. 2011).
278. Camby, 701 P.2d at 500.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
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his threats to Gray,283 the policeman arrested Camby.284 Both Gray and
the policemen testified that Gray had not been provoked by Camby
and that Gray had had no intention of going outside to fight Camby.285
The Washington court explained that for an expression to count as
fighting words, “the words must be directed at a particular person or
group of persons.”286 In addition, the words themselves must be “those
personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary
citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to
provoke violent reaction.”287 In the court’s view, both of these conditions
were met.288 The last step involves “look[ing] at the words in the context
or situation in which they were made.”289 The court explained, “Looking
at the actual situation presented in this case, we find an intoxicated
defendant being escorted out of a restaurant by a mild mannered,
unaroused doorman-host with a police officer present.”290 While “[a]
civilian addressee need not, in fact, be incited to breach the peace,”291
more had to be shown to establish that “a substantial risk of assault
[was] created.”292 The court found “as a matter of law that the words
spoken in this situation [were] not ‘fighting words’ and that no
substantial risk of assault was created.”293
The Arizona Supreme Court endorsed and (allegedly) adopted the
Washington approach.294 When deciding whether a student who had
called a teacher a bitch several times295 had expressed speech falling into
the fighting words exception, the court rejected that the student’s
“insults would likely have provoked an ordinary teacher to ‘exchange
283. Id. (citation omitted) (“At that point, Camby told Gray to ‘come outside so
I can kick your fucking ass’. [The policeman] again told Camby to be quiet
and leave. Camby retorted, ‘I’ll either get him tonight or later.’”).
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 501 (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971)).
287. Id. (quoting Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20).
288. Id. (“Presuming the first two steps are present, which in this case they
are . . . .”).
289. Id.
290. Id. at 502.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 500.
294. See In re Nickolas S., 245 P.3d 446, 451 (Ariz. 2011) (“Based on the
Supreme Court’s decisions, we agree with the Washington Supreme Court
that analyzing whether particular speech constitutes fighting words involves
a three-step inquiry.” (citing Camby, 701 P.2d at 501)).
295. See id. at 452.
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fisticuffs’ with the student or to otherwise react violently.”296 Ironically,
while attempting to apply the Washington standard, the Arizona court
instead applied a different standard. The Arizona court realized that
the relevant “inquiry is not whether a reasonable person ‘might’ react
violently, but instead whether someone in the circumstances of the
addressee would likely react violently in the context in which the words
were spoken.”297 The court then shifted the standard from the reason–
able person to the reasonable teacher—“we do not believe that his
insults would likely have provoked an ordinary teacher to ‘exchange
fisticuffs’ with the student or to otherwise react violently.”298 But the
Washington court had been more focused on the particular victim,
noting that the “mild mannered, unaroused doorman-host with a police
officer present”299 did not seem likely to engage in fisticuffs. The
question was not merely whether a reasonable person in that profession
would respond violently but whether the person at whom the comments
were addressed would so respond. Thus, even the courts who realize
that Supreme Court precedent may limit Chaplinsky cannot agree about
how that case has been limited.______________________

Conclusion
The United States Supreme Court has recognized a fighting words
exception, which is one of the “well-defined and narrowly limited classes
of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problem.”300 But Court practices
defy that description, because the category is neither well-defined nor
narrowly limited. The Court has sent contradictory signals about
whether it is necessary that the comments are likely to bring about
violence in the context in which they are uttered. Further, the Court
has sometimes included an “inflicts injury” prong within the fighting
words exception and sometimes not. Finally, the Court has not
adequately explained whether or how offensive insults as opposed to
offensive ideas fit within the jurisprudence.
Unsurprisingly, the state interpretations of the jurisprudence vary
significantly. Some state courts have bridged the gap between words
296. Id. (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989)).
297. Id.
298. Id.; see also State v. Baccala, 163 A.3d 1, 10 (Conn. 2017) (“In sum, these
cases affirm the fundamental principle that there are no per se fighting words;
rather, courts must determine on a case-by-case basis all of the circumstances
relevant to whether a reasonable person in the position of the actual addressee
would have been likely to respond with violence.”).
299. Camby, 701 P.2d at 502.
300. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942).
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that will injure and words that will cause a breach of the peace by
suggesting that the words designed to injure will themselves bring about
an immediate breach of the peace.301 Other courts have not seen a need
to bridge the gap between inflicting injury and provoking an immediate
breach of the peace.302
Some state courts interpret the Federal Constitution to require that
violence will likely occur in the very circumstances in which the words
are offered, while other state courts offer a different interpretation.303 In
short, state courts do not know what the prevailing jurisprudence re–
quires, permits, and prohibits, which means that neither the courts nor
the legislatures can know the parameters within which they can
effectuate public policy.
This lack of clarity has costs. Individuals may be subject to criminal
prosecution when the First Amendment, properly understood, precludes
such punishment. Or, individuals may be forced to endure verbal
assaults which they would not be forced to endure but for a “mistaken”
interpretation of the First Amendment. In addition, the lack of clarity
invites inconsistent enforcement of First Amendment guarantees across
jurisdictions, which itself is problematic.
At its first opportunity, the Court should clarify the jurisprudence,
making clear what the First Amendment permits and prohibits. Doing

301. In re S.J.N-K., 647 N.W.2d 707, 711–12 (S.D. 2002) (“‘Fighting words,’ as
defined in Chaplinsky are those words that ‘inflict injury’ or ‘incite an
immediate breach of peace.’ They have also been defined as ‘[]those personally
abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter
of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke a violent reaction.’” (first
quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572; and then quoting Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971))); In re Spivey, 480 S.E.2d 693, 698 (N.C. 1997) (“At
the hearing on this matter, there was testimony concerning the hurt and anger
caused African-Americans when they are subjected to racial slurs by white
people.”); id. at 699 (“[I]n context, his repeated [racial slurs] presents a classic
case of the use of ‘fighting words’ tending to incite an immediate breach of the
peace which are not protected by . . . the Constitution.”); City of Billings v.
Nelson, 322 P.3d 1039, 1045 (Mont. 2014) (alteration in original) (“Nelson
argues the words ‘spic bastard,’ though ‘harsh, co[a]rse, hurtful, vulgar,
unpleasant, distasteful, or rude,’ are not fighting words. She also argues she
was not face-to-face with M.C. because she remained inside her vehicle. The
use of a racial slur is the type of speech that would, by its very utterance,
inflict injury and tend to incite a breach of the peace.” (citing State v. Dugan,
303 P.3d 755, 761 (Mont. 2013))).
302. See, e.g., State v. Vaughn, 366 S.W.3d 513, 521 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) (“Acts
that cause immediate substantial fright, intimidation, or emotional distress
are the sort of acts that inherently tend to inflict injury or provoke violence.”).
303. See supra Part III.
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so would promote uniformity of application304 and would promote con–
fidence that rules are being applied consistently rather than to serve
other purposes.305 The failure to clarify an allegedly well-defined and
narrow category undermines confidence in the First Amendment and in
the Court, a result that no one should desire. ______________

304. See Note, supra note 3, at 1144 (“A statute that mimics the ‘breach of the
peace’ prong of Chaplinsky confers significant discretion upon an enforcing
officer and thus invites abuse.”).
305. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 415–16 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (“I fear that the Court has been distracted from its proper
mission by the temptation to decide the issue over ‘politically correct speech’
and ‘cultural diversity,’ neither of which is presented here.”).
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